Dr. Colin Allen, Provost Professor of Cognitive Science and
History & Philosophy of Science and Director of the Indiana University Cognitive Science Program, will lecture on "Moral Machines" on Sunday, October 7. Here, he discusses some of the ideas surrounding machines and morality.
1. What kind of morality do we attribute to machines –
if any? If there isn’t now, will there ever be?
The "we" in the question is rather broad -- I think there are many
people who think that the whole idea of attributing any kind of morality
to artificial machines is ludicrous.
I have argued, however, that we can think
of three levels of moral capacity that might be applied to machines. The
first and lowest level is "operational" morality, which really means
nothing more than that the machines we build embody the moral outlook of
the people who designed and deployed them. For example, software
already exists that offers advice to hospital administrators and
physicians on which patients should receive scarce medical
resources; insofar as this software takes some factors into account (e.g.,
factors predicting likelihood of survival) but not others (e.g. number of
dependent children) then it embodies moral assumptions about the importance or
unimportance of those factors for making morally responsible decisions
about health care.
The highest level is full human-equivalent moral
capacity, and this is a holy grail of artificial intelligence research. I
tend to think that this is achievable in the long run, but currently that is so
far away that it's in the realm of science fiction. However, in between
these two there's an intermediate level that I call "functional morality"
in which the system is designed to evaluate actions according to their
moral consequences. There are currently a few prototypes for such systems,
but nothing in production. However, there are applications being developed for
medical care and supervision of elderly patients and in military
robotics where systems might be required to evaluate conformity with the Geneva
conventions and legal aspects pertaining to combat operations. Will such
systems ever be deployed? I tend to think that functional morality for
eldercare systems is more likely than functional morality in systems
designed for robotic warfare, but I would not want to bet a lot of
money on that.
2. What interests you about morality and the
relationship between humans and machines?
Morality is one of those things that people have held up as distinguishing us
from other animals. That premise is obvious to some and doubtful to
others, but the point is that there's a lot of of interest in just what
morality is and how we come to display it because it seems so central to
human nature. Some people like to point out that humans are more immoral than
moral, that only reinforces the point; to be capable of acting immorally
one has to be also capable of acting morally. We don't think of the
shark that attacks a surfer as acting either morally or immorally -- it is
amoral. But immoral actions by humans only deserve that label because of
the capacity for morality.
Machines add an interesting twist into the fundamentally philosophical question
of who and what we are. The challenge of creating artificial moral agents
is ultimately about understanding what makes us human. And whether the
project of creating artificial morality succeeds, or whether it fails, it
is potentially instructive about the cognitive and emotional processes that
drive our own moral behavior.
3. Can machines ever exhibit “better” behavior than
humans?
Machines are in principle less distractable, less susceptible to emotion-driven loss of control, and more capable of carrying out longer chains of
reasoning or calculation than humans. I think that for these kinds of reasons,
machines could do better than humans at foreseeing bad consequences of
certain actions, and thus avoiding them. In these cases, they would
exhibit "better" behavior. However, there's more to morality
than this, and the machines we have currently lack the kind of powerful
perceptual systems and complex pattern recognition of humans, and because
they lack proper emotions, they lack the good side of emotional attachment
as much as they lack the bad side that can lead to atrocious behavior. Some
scientists have argued that since emotions are a net negative influence on
our moral behavior, machines will be better than humans (at least in high-stress situations
such as battlefields) because they won't be subject to those negative
influences. However, I think that it's far from obvious that
emotions are a net negative for morality, and so until we have more convincing
models of how emotion and cognition interact in moral behavior it's hard
to say whether machines can ever exhibit better all round behavior than humans.
I've already said that I think it can be done, but we are a long way
from accomplishing this. In the mean time, that doesn't mean we can't
be working on making machines exhibit better behavior than they presently
do -- continuing to press into the realm of functional morality, in other
words.
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| The replicant Roy from Blade Runner |
4. Originally Themester planned to show Blade Runner
(but couldn’t for legal reasons). Are we grappling with any of the moral
issues in that film today? Will we ever?
The level of technology in Blade Runner is way beyond anything we currently
have so I don't think we are grappling in a serious way with those moral
issues at the moment (although science fiction writers and certain philosophers
will continue to do so in a speculative way). I think that perhaps
there is too much attention on the far future technologies, however. It
distracts us from seriously considering the moral limitations of the
semi-autonomous and autonomous machines that we are increasingly
putting into service -- everything from call-answering systems to
driverless cars.
5. What is your favorite fictional machine and why?
My favorite is Marvin the Paranoid Android from Douglas Adams' The
Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy. I primarily like him, because
he's funny: ‘"Reverse primary thrust, Marvin." That's what they say
to me. "Open airlock number 3, Marvin." "Marvin,
can you pick up that piece of paper?" Here I am, brain the size
of a planet, and they ask me to pick up a piece of
paper.’ His resignation to his fate of serving the much less
intelligent biological life forms around him, coupled with his self-professed
capacity to solve all of the major problems of the Universe "except
his own" is a perfect encapsulation of why we build machines -- to
serve us and for self-understanding, the latter a task for which there is
no guarantee of success.
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| Marvin the Paranoid Android |
6. Included in the description of your talk is the
quote by Rosalind Picard of MIT, “The greater the freedom of a
machine, the more it will need moral standards.” What does that
mean?
Like it or not, we more and more live among and interact with partially
intelligent machines. In fact, I just got off a phone call in which
about half of what I said was said to a machine (and, I'll add, the machine was
more accurate in taking down the tracking number that I spoke into the
phone than was the person who eventually came on the line, for whom I had to
repeat it).
Right now, these machines are ethically
"blind" -- they don't even gather information that could be relevant
to providing an appropriate response -- for instance about the level of
urgency involved in tracking my package. With a human operator one could
explain whether the failed delivery was (or was not) causing a lot of
unnecessary pain, and the operator could prioritize the
request accordingly. The machine currently has no such capacity. A
dumb "operational morality" approach would be to allow people
to rank the urgency of the request on a scale of 1 to 7. But this
would be dumb because the kind of information gathering is very limited,
the measure is very crude, and it would be entirely up to the programmer to
figure out what to do with, e.g., a 7 ranking vs. a 6.
I think we are
going to want to have machines that respond more flexibly to our needs by
interacting with us and assessing the cues we provide in a more natural
way than simply asking for a numerical ratings. And because these machines
are operating in more and more open environments and have more and more
options to select among (this is what Picard means by the freedom of the
machine), the more they will need to have the real-time capacity to weigh
various pieces of morally relevant information and act accordingly, rather
than following some simple rule in which the programmer has tried to anticipate
all the situations the machine will encounter.
For more information on Dr. Allen's talk, refer to http://saiu.org/2012/09/07/moral-machines-a-talk-by-colin-allen/.
Rebecca Kimberly
Themester 2012 Intern